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The "Innocence and Redressability" Exception: A Fair
Alternative to Habeas Jurisprudence's Direct Versus Collateral
Consequence Dichotomy*
INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 1999, a Virginia state jury convicted Eric Wilson of
rape, sentencing him to eight and one-half years in prison.' In
addition to requiring a substantial prison sentence, Wilson's status as
a sex offender also requires him to comply with the sex offender
registration requirements of any state in which he chooses to reside.2
Wilson must annually re-register in person with local law
enforcement, inform the authorities of any updates in "contact
information, ... educational status, and employment," and notify
them of any travel plans.3 Wilson cannot change his address without
first notifying the local authorities in "both his previous [county of]
residence and his new [county of] residence."' Nor can he legally
adopt his stepson, or even visit him at school, without first passing a
background check.' Retribution is the penological rationale that
would normally validate the punishments imposed.6 But what if
evidence existed that proved Wilson had been wrongfully convicted?
Ostensibly, the writ of habeas corpus-a legal mechanism by
which courts can inquire into the lawfulness of an individual's
detainment-exists to exonerate individuals in the situation described
* @ 2014 J. Clay Douglas.
1. Wilson v. Flaherty, No. 3:10CV536, 2011 WL 2471207, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 20,
2011), aff'd, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013); see infra Part
II.A (detailing Eric Wilson's state court conviction).
2. See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 334 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that Wilson
initially registered in Virginia, but has been registered under Texas statutes since he
moved there).
3. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9-10, Wilson, 689 F.3d 332 (No. 12-986).
4. See id. at 9; see also infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (describing more
restrictions imposed upon Wilson as a result of his sex offender status-restrictions that
are, perhaps, even more invasive).
5. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 335.
6. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 655, 658 (1989) ("[Retribution] has enjoyed wide
scholarly acceptance in recent writings on punishment."). In short, the retribution theory
of punishment holds that intentional pain (or restriction of liberty) should be imposed on
offenders for violating their moral responsibility to abide by the law. See id. at 659 ("The
theory holds that punishment is justified when it is deserved.").
7. See infra Part II.A.
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above. The "Great Writ" is generally known as the principal means
by which individuals can restore liberty that has been unlawfully
taken from them.' Congress has statutorily armed federal courts with
the power to invoke the writ of habeas corpus in Title 28 of the U.S.
Code.9 Notably, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides that anyone convicted of a
state crime can challenge the constitutionality of such a conviction in
federal court."o Similar to other federal habeas statutes, § 2254 only
grants federal jurisdiction to an individual who applies for the writ
while she is "in custody pursuant to the judgment of a . . . court.""
More specifically, those who apply for § 2254 habeas relief must be
"in custody under the conviction ... under attack" at the moment the
habeas petition is filed for a federal court to exercise proper
jurisdiction over the claim.
Not since the 1960s, however, have federal courts restricted
§ 2254's "custody" language to refer only to physical detainment. 3 In
the seminal case Jones v. Cunningham,4 the Supreme Court ruled
that, "besides physical imprisonment, there are other restraints on a
man's liberty, restraints not shared by the public generally," that are
restrictive enough to fulfill the habeas custody requirement."s
Although the Jones decision held that an individual released on
parole suffers enough restraint to meet the custody requirement,'6 in
other circumstances federal courts have struggled to determine
8. See RONALD P. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 13 (2d ed. 1969) ("[T]he writ
of habeas corpus is now the most usual remedy by which a man is restored again to his
liberty if he hath been against law deprived of it .... " (quoting Maxwell Cohen, Habeas
Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern Writ-II, 18 CAN. BAR REV. 172, 181
(1940))).
9. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2012).
10. Id. § 2254(a). See generally WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
OF HABEAS CORPUS 181-224 (1980) (discussing the history of Congress's decision to
grant federal habeas relief to individuals challenging a state conviction).
11. See § 2254(a) (requiring an individual to be in custody under a state conviction);
see also id. § 2255 (requiring an individual to be in custody pursuant to a federal statute).
12. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (per curiam) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)).
13. See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Jones v.
Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239-40 (1963)); see also SOKOL, supra note 8, at 66 ("Custody
does not necessarily mean actual physical detention in a jail or prison."); Ruth A. Moyer,
Avoiding "Magic Mirrors"-A Post-Padilla Congressional Solution to the 28 U.S. C. § 2254
"Custody" and "Collateral" Sanctions Dilemma, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 753, 771
(2012) (noting that the Supreme Court began expanding its definition of "custody" during
the 1960s).
14. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
15. Id. at 240 (interpreting the custody requirement of § 2241).
16. Id. at 243.
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whether one's liberty has been restrained enough to make the writ of
habeas corpus available."
Recently, a Fourth Circuit panel fervently debated the limits of
§ 2254's custody requirement in Wilson v. Flaherty." The petitioner
argued that the sex offender registration requirements rendered him
"in custody" under § 2254.'1 After the federal district court dismissed
his petition, Wilson, who had previously been convicted of rape and
had fully served his sentence, turned to the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.20 Wilson based his petition on the emergence of new
evidence-evidence that strongly indicated his innocence.21
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal,
stating that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction since Wilson
was not in custody at the time he filed his petition.22 In other words,
the Fourth Circuit majority did not believe that the collateral
consequences of Wilson's rape conviction restrained his liberty
severely enough to allow him access to the writ of habeas corpus. 23
Moreover, the majority opinion suggested that no collateral
consequences, no matter how severe, could ever restrain an
individual's liberty enough to entitle that individual to habeas relief.24
This Recent Development argues that the Fourth Circuit erred in
dismissing Wilson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and, as a
result, haphazardly promoted an overly restrictive interpretation of
§ 2254's custody requirement. Given the increasing frequency and
severity of collateral consequences in our criminal justice system,' it
17. See SOKOL, supra note 8, at 67 (describing the custody requirement as a spectrum
between mere "moral restraint"-which does not rise to the level of "in custody" for
habeas relief-and "actual incarceration"-which clearly does). See generally Moyer,
supra note 13 (analyzing the effects of collateral consequences on the interpretation of
§ 2254 and Sixth Amendment jurisprudence generally).
18. 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012).
19. Id. at 333.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 333-34. In fact, the new evidence eventually resulted in another man
confessing to the rape and murder of Michelle Bosko, the woman Wilson had been
accused of raping. Id. at 334; see infra Part II.A (discussing the facts in more detail).
22. Wilson, 689 F.3d at 333.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 337 ("If we were to find that the [sex offender registration] requirements
of those statutes were not in fact collateral consequences, then we would be holding that
any convicted sex offender could challenge his conviction 'at any time on federal habeas,'
with the consequence that the in-custody jurisdictional requirement of § 2254 would be
read out of the statute." (quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam))).
As discussed in Part III, this viewpoint-though arguably incorrect-is not uncommon.
25. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent
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is alarming that the court's opinion hastily precludes any argument a
future habeas petitioner may have that such consequences fulfill the
custody requirement. This Recent Development contends that,
instead of focusing primarily on the direct versus collateral
consequence dichotomy, the court should have adopted the approach
proposed by Judge Wynn's dissent-what this Recent Development
deems the "innocence and redressability" exception. This exception-
which considers whether a habeas petitioner has exhausted all other
potential remedies and can state a convincing claim of innocence-
more aptly encompasses the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus,
while still abiding by the strictures of habeas statutes like 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.26
The facts in Wilson provided the court with a prime opportunity
to dispose of the harsh effects of the direct versus collateral
consequence dichotomy. Yet despite the fact that Supreme Court
precedent explicitly allows for a narrow expansion in the
interpretation of the custody requirement,2 7 the Fourth Circuit opted
for an unduly conservative reading of § 2254 over the "more
fundamental, substantive concerns" of habeas corpus. 28 The result is a
disappointing, and morally alarming, restraint on an individual's
liberty.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly reviews the history
behind 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and discusses the increased use of collateral
consequences and its associated problems. Next, Part II summarizes
the facts and holding of Wilson. Part III then analyzes the Wilson
opinion, concluding that the majority mistakenly adopted a narrow
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent and non-binding cases
from its sister circuits. Thereafter, Part IV examines Judge Wynn's
dissent, focusing on his "innocence and redressability" argument. 29
This Recent Development ultimately concludes that the Fourth
Circuit should have adopted the "innocence and redressability"
exception to help interpret the custody requirement and ensure that
habeas corpus's focus on justice is not sacrificed for adherence to
procedure.
Predators," 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 673 (2008) ("The number and severity of collateral
consequences ... have greatly expanded in recent years.").
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part III.A.
28. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 343 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
29. Judge Wynn has not coined any specific term for his argument. This phrase merely
serves as a simple way for this Recent Development to refer to Judge Wynn's dissent as a
whole.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
I. INTERPRETATION OF § 2254'S "IN CUSTODY" REQUIREMENT:
How COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES FIT (OR DON'T FIT) INTO THE
EQUATION
Before proceeding into a discussion of the facts in Wilson and the
rationales behind the majority and dissenting opinions, it is instructive
to first examine the history behind federal habeas statutes, as well as
the challenges courts face in light of the increasing frequency and
severity of collateral consequences.
A. Reviewing State Convictions in Federal Court: A Brief History of
the Federal Habeas Statutes
Congress formally enacted federal habeas statutes in Title 28 of
the U.S. Code.3 0 The writ of habeas corpus itself, however, has existed
since well before the Founding Fathers even conceptualized our
nation's Constitution.3 1 Intriguingly, the writ of habeas corpus was not
originally used for challenging detentions based on alleged wrongful
convictions.32 Instead, in its original use, the writ of habeas corpus was
a method by which the authorities in Anglo-Saxon England could
compel a person to appear, perhaps involuntarily, before the king's
council.33
Although authorities employed the writ of habeas corpus in its
modern understanding as early as the fourteenth century,3 4 it was not
until the seventeenth century that the writ's contemporary function-
to determine whether an individual's imprisonment was "just or
legal"-became its primary use.35 By the time the colonies were
founded, however, the modern writ had already become a permanent
30. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
31. See DUKER, supra note 10, at 12 (establishing the writ's existence as far back as
the thirteenth century).
32. See id. at 13.
33. See id. at 13-15. Another reason-perhaps the primary reason-the Norman King,
William the Conqueror, utilized the writ of habeas corpus was to centralize the existing
court system he found upon his arrival in England. See id. at 14. If making the formerly
localized court system in England more efficient did not provide enough impetus to issue
the writ, then the financial benefits provided by fines and payments associated with the
hearings certainly did. See id. at 15.
34. See SOKOL, supra note 8, at 5-6 ("Then in 1341 comes a case involving a writ of
habeas corpus issuing out of the king's court and directed to a jailer ordering him to
produce the body of the named person with the cause of the arrest and detention."
(quoting Maxwell Cohen, Habeas Corpus Cum Causa-The Emergence of the Modern
Writ-I, 18 CAN. BAR REV. 10, 13 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Actually,
since the writ is now typically invoked by detainees themselves, this fourteenth century
example is not completely akin to the writ's modern use. The purpose, however-to prove
a valid cause of arrest-is the same.
35. See id. at 12 & n.45.
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part of English common law.36 For good measure, the writ's inclusion
in the U.S. Constitution dispelled any lingering doubts about its
permanence in American jurisprudence."
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 laid the foundation for the
modern Title 28 federal habeas statutes.38 The Act provided federal
courts with the power to issue the writ "in all cases where any person
may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution,
or of any treaty or law of the United States."3 9 Although not explicit,
the language of the Act is certainly broad enough to conclude that
this applied to both state and federal prisoners.4 0 Initially, jurisdiction
of federal courts to review a state conviction engendered heated
debate concerning state sovereignty.41 In modern times, however,
arguing against the federal courts' jurisdiction in this arena is
practically futile: 28 U.S.C. § 2254 explicitly provides federal courts
with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus for individuals in
custody under a state conviction.42 Instead, the debate now revolves
around the following question: When is an individual in custody? 43
B. The Collateral Consequence Conundrum
Reliance on the modern doctrine of collateral consequences has
not aided courts in their quest to determine the contours of the
custody requirement.4 Unlike the direct consequences of a
conviction, which are those punishments that stem directly from the
36. See id. at 15.
37. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it."); see also SOKOL, supra note 8, at 16 (explaining that the habeas clause "was
added over the objection of three states which advocated that the writ ought never to be
suspended").
38. See DUKER, supra note 10, at 189.
39. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (2012)).
40. See DUKER, supra note 10, at 189-90.
41. See id. at 181-224 (providing a thorough analysis of the history behind the federal
habeas power to review state convictions).
42. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012).
43. The Supreme Court has considered this question several times. See, e.g., Maleng v.
Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) (per curiam) (holding that a petitioner is not in custody
under an already served state conviction "simply because that conviction [can be] used to
enhance the length of a current or future sentence imposed for a subsequent conviction");
Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 345, 351 (1973) (holding that a defendant "released
on his own recognizance" prior to the start of his sentence was still in custody for federal
habeas purposes); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963) (establishing that a
petitioner released on parole was still "in custody" pursuant to the relevant state
conviction for § 2241 purposes).
44. See Moyer, supra note 13, at 755.
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"sentence of the court"-such as fines or the length of the sentence
itself-collateral consequences "stem from the fact of conviction."4 5
The category can include anything from "civil commitment" and
"registration requirements" to prohibitions against owning firearms.4 6
Many collateral consequences, like direct consequences, are codified
in federal, state, and local statutes.47 But in large part, collateral
consequences, such as the effects certain convictions have on an
individual's employment prospects, are determined by society at-
large."
Though the direct consequences of a conviction-like the prison
sentence itself-typically receive more attention in scholarly debates
about the severity of punishments inflicted by the criminal justice
system, in many cases the collateral consequences of a conviction can
affect an individual long after the direct consequences have
disappeared.4 9 For example, a first-time offender for certain felonies
can plead guilty and "walk out of court."" Although the direct
consequences of such an offense are relatively small, the collateral
consequences could be significant." As Gabriel Chin and Richard
Holmes have noted, collateral consequences can render individuals
ineligible for many benefits and, in some circumstances, even strip
them of certain rights:
By virtue of the conviction, the offender may become ineligible
for federally funded health care benefits, food stamps and
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and housing
assistance. She is ineligible for federal educational aid. Her
driver's license will probably be suspended and she will be
ineligible to enlist in the military, receive a security clearance,
or possess a firearm. If an alien, she will be deported; if a
45. Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86
B.U. L. REv. 623, 634 (2006).
46. See Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and
the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 705 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Moyer, supra note 13, at 761.
48. See, e.g., id. at 761-62 ("[C]ollateral consequences may include, for example, the
loss of the right to vote, to engage in some occupations, to hold public office, or to serve as
a juror, as well as the possibility of deportation."). In general, collateral consequences
"limit the convicted individual's social, economic, and political access." Pinard, supra note
45, at 634-35.
49. See Moyer, supra note 13, at 764.
50. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 46, at 699.
51. See id.
696 [Vol. 92
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citizen, she will be ineligible to serve on a federal jury and in
some states will lose her right to vote.52
As demonstrated, "collateral" does not necessarily mean
"insignificant." Regardless, courts generally hold collateral
consequences, in and of themselves, as insufficient for purposes of
satisfying the habeas custody requirement-a stance that has evoked
its fair share of criticism in the legal community."
In some circumstances, a per se rule that collateral consequences
do not fulfill the § 2254 custody requirement can actually prevent
those convicted of minor offenses-"short sentence" petitioners-
from ever mounting a federal habeas challenge to their conviction.54
First, consider that under § 2254(b)-(c), which codifies the
"exhaustion doctrine,"" a habeas petitioner must seek all available
state remedies before a federal court will review her petition.56 In
addition, the petitioner must file the petition for a writ of habeas
corpus while she is still in custody under the challenged conviction.
Therefore, in the situation of a "short sentence" conviction, by the
time the petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies-
a process that could take years-she will likely have already
completed the original sentence and thus be precluded from filing for
habeas corpus under § 2254.s8 Despite the fact that the petitioner
could be subject to the collateral consequences for years after her
sentence has expired,59 and regardless of whether she is actually
innocent, federal habeas statutes provide zero relief.
52. See id. at 699-700 (citations omitted).
53. See, e.g., Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 341 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J.,
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority's view that sex offender registration is "too
collateral to satisfy the requirement that a habeas petitioner be in custody"); Moyer, supra
note 13, at 792-95. See generally Roberts, supra note 25 (arguing that the automatic
exclusion of collateral consequences from "in custody" consideration has created myriad
problems in providing effective counsel to defendants who are considering plea bargains).
54. This idea and the example that follows can be found in Ruth A. Moyer's 2012
article, Avoiding "Magic Mirrors"--A Post-Padilla Congressional Solution to the 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 "Custody" and "Collateral" Sanctions Dilemma. See Moyer, supra note 13, at 794-
95.
55. See MICHAEL L. WELLS ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL COURTS
847 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that the exhaustion doctrine was first announced in Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886)); see also infra note 144 (discussing the exhaustion doctrine).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (2012). See generally O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.
838 (1999) (discussing, extensively, the "exhaustion doctrine").
57. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (per curiam) (citing Carafas v.
LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)).
58. See Moyer, supra note 13, at 794-95.
59. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court, nonetheless, has never entirely precluded
the possibility that at least some collateral consequences might be
severe enough to satisfy the custody requirement of § 2254.' Initially,
following the Jones decision, the Supreme Court took a step towards
including collateral consequences in its definition of "in custody." 61 In
Carafas v. Lavelle,62 the Court held that an individual could be in
custody for habeas purposes, even after fully serving the sentence of
the challenged conviction, as long as two requirements were met: the
petitioner must have applied for habeas relief while still serving the
sentence, and the petitioner must still be experiencing collateral
consequences from the challenged conviction.6 3 After Carafas,
however, the following question still loomed: Could the collateral
consequences of a conviction, by themselves, satisfy the custody
requirement?' The 1989 Supreme Court case Maleng v. Cook65
partially answered this question when the Court held that if the only
collateral consequence a petitioner suffers from a previous conviction
is that such conviction can be used to enhance a sentence imposed by
a subsequent conviction, then the consequence will not fulfill the
habeas custody requirement.66
As the Wilson majority correctly noted, Maleng explicitly
established that the Supreme Court "never held ... that a habeas
petitioner may be 'in custody' under a conviction when the sentence
imposed for that conviction has fully expired at the time his petition is
filed."67 Rather, the Maleng Court stated that precedent "strongly
implie[d]" that after a sentence expires, the collateral consequences
of a conviction do not restrain an individual's liberty severely enough
60. See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 345 (2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting) ("In my
view, the general rule articulated and refined by the Supreme Court in Maleng, Daniels,
and Coss precluding a petitioner from challenging a fully expired prior conviction does not
preclude Wilson from challenging his Virginia conviction."); infra Part III.A.
61. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968).
62. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
63. See id. at 238 ("[Olnce the federal jurisdiction has attached in the District Court, it
is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings on such
application."). The Court stated that the second requirement-that petitioner must still
experience collateral consequences stemming from the challenged conviction-was
necessary to prevent mootness. See id. at 237-38.
64. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam) ("We rested [the
Carafas] holding not on the collateral consequences of the conviction, but on the fact that
the petitioner had been in physical custody under the challenged conviction at the time the
petition was filed." (citing Carafas, 391 U.S. at 238)).
65. 490 U.S. 488 (1989).
66. See id. at 492.
67. See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 336 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Maleng, 490 U.S.
at 491).
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to satisfy the habeas custody requirement.' Since Maleng, courts have
generally continued this trend.' In some instances, even prior to
Maleng, courts have gone as far as to categorically bar any collateral
consequences, however harsh, from satisfying the custody
requirement.70 However, the recent increase in the use and severity of
collateral consequences in the criminal context 71 has prompted some
legal commentators to urge that courts refrain from automatically
labeling all collateral consequences as insufficient to fulfill the
custody requirement.72
In contrast to its treatment of collateral consequences in habeas
jurisprudence, in the context of Sixth Amendment cases, the Supreme
Court has emphasized the potential impact certain collateral
consequences have on individuals' lives." In Padilla v. Kentucky,74 for
example, the Supreme Court established that in order to provide
effective counsel, an attorney must warn clients of the possible effects
a guilty plea may have on deportation proceedings-a collateral
consequence. It is therefore clear that the Supreme Court at least
acknowledges the gravity of certain collateral consequences.
Nevertheless, courts still commonly hold that collateral consequences,
as a class, fail to sufficiently restrain liberty enough to make the writ
68. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491-92. The previous case which Maleng specifically
referred to was Carafas.
69. See, e.g., Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 384 (2001) (holding that petitioner
could not use 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge prior fully-served convictions simply because
such convictions were used to enhance the sentence of a new conviction); Lackawanna
Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 396-97 (2001) (holding the same for a § 2254
claim). But see, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (allowing
petitioner to collaterally challenge a previous rape conviction despite the fact that the
petitioner's sentence for the conviction had already been fully served).
70. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) ("[E]ven grievous
collateral consequences stemming directly from a conviction cannot, without more,
transform the absence of custody into the presence of custody for the purpose of habeas
review." (citations omitted)).
71. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 46, at 699 ("[Tlhe imposition of collateral
consequences has become an increasingly central purpose of the modern criminal
process."); Moyer, supra note 13, at 763-64; Roberts, supra note 25, at 673.
72. See, e.g., Joshua D. Smith, Comment, Habeas Corpus: Expired Conviction,
Expired Relief- Can the Writ of Habeas Corpus Be Used to Test the Constitutionality of a
Deportation Based on an Expired Conviction?, 58 OKLA. L. REv. 59, 83 (2005) (arguing
that the collateral consequence of deportation proceedings based on a prior, fully served
conviction should render a petitioner "in custody" for habeas purposes).
73. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2010).
74. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
75. See id. at 374. See generally Moyer, supra note 13 (proposing a "Post-Padilla"
solution to the inconsistent treatment of collateral consequences between federal habeas
actions and ineffective counsel cases).
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of habeas corpus available to petitioners-no matter how much
evidence exists indicating a particular petitioner's innocence.76
II. WILSON V. FLAHERTY
A. Wilson's Controversial Conviction
On July 8, 1997, following Navy basic training, William Bosko
returned home to Norfolk, Virginia, hoping to see his new wife of
three months, Michelle, waiting for him at the pier." After she failed
to appear, Bosko returned to the couple's apartment." Upon arrival,
he witnessed a gruesome scene; his wife lay dead on the bedroom
floor, in a pool of her own blood.79 Police and forensics analysts later
determined that before her death, caused by multiple knife-wounds to
the chest and strangulation, Michelle had also been raped.s0
Immediately, police interrogated Danial Williams, who lived in
the same apartment complex as the Boskos.1 After one night of
interrogation, Williams confessed that he raped and killed Michelle
Bosko by himself.82 Oddly, three more men-Joseph Dick, Jr., Derek
Tice, and Eric Wilson-soon confessed that they too had raped
Michelle Bosko. 3 Despite inconsistencies between each suspect's
statements regarding the event," all four men were prosecuted as
76. See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 334 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting the "exculpatory
new evidence" pointing to the petitioner's actual innocence); see also Virsnieks v. Smith,
521 F.3d 707, 718 (7th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he collateral consequences of a conviction, those
consequences with negligible effects on a petitioner's physical liberty of movement, are
insufficient to satisfy the custody requirement." (citations omitted)); Williamson v.
Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he boundary that limits the 'in custody'
requirement is the line between a 'restraint on liberty' and a 'collateral consequence of a
conviction.' ").
77. Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 2011). The Wilson court references Tice
in the majority opinion, stating that Tice "set forth the facts relating to the Bosko murder,
the investigation, trials, and exculpatory new evidence in detail." Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334.
78. Tice, 647 F.3d at 89. Williams stated that he thought Michelle had begun working
a new job, thus preventing her from greeting him. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id. The opinion also states that the police found a bloody steak knife in the
vicinity, "the serrated blade bent at nearly a right angle to its handle." See id.
81. See id. at 90, 93.
82. Id. at 93.
83. Id.
84. For example, Joseph Dick originally only implicated Danial Williams and himself
when first interrogated, but later implicated Eric Wilson and a man named "George
Clark," whom police later determined to be Derek Tice. See Opening Brief at 7-8, 11,
Tice, 647 F.3d 87 (No. 09-8245). Tice, however, informed investigators that two additional
men, Rick Pauley and Jeffrey Farris, were present during the crime. See id. at 14.
Interestingly, Tice expressed doubt concerning whether Rick Pauley was actually involved
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though they had perpetrated the horrendous crime together." Out of
the four men-collectively referred to in the media as the "Norfolk
Four"-three eventually either pleaded guilty or were found guilty of
murder and rape.86 Eric Wilson, however, was convicted only of rape
and sentenced to eight and one-half years in prison."
Despite allegations that the Norfolk Four killed Michelle Bosko
during an evil, spontaneous romp, the results of the investigation
suggested a much different truth." Notably, though one suspect
testified to the contrary,89 there were no signs of forced entry at the
Bosko residence.9 0 Moreover, forensics determined that DNA testing
of semen found at the scene of the crime did not match any member
of the Norfolk Four.9 ' The DNA tests implicated a man who had not
even been included in the original suspect list, Omar Ballard.' After
confrontation by authorities, Ballard eventually confessed to the
with the crime. See id. These inconsistencies only provide a small glance at the confusing
results of the interrogations and trials.
85. See Executive Summary Relating to the Petition for Clemency for Joseph J. Dick,
Jr., Derek E. Tice & Danial J. Williams 2 (Nov. 10, 2008) [hereinafter Executive
Summary], available at http://www.norfolkfour.com/images/uploads/pdfjfiles/Executive
.Summary.PDF ("[A]fter police could not find a DNA match to the crime scene, the
Commonwealth's theory began to evolve, ultimately morphing into a gang rape
scenario....").
86. See Tice v. Johnson, No. 3:08CV69, 2009 WL 2947380, at *3 (E.D. Va. Sept. 14,
2009), aff'd, 647 F.3d 87 (4th Cir. 2011). Danial Williams and Joseph Dick both pleaded
guilty to murder and rape in 1999. Id. Derek Tice was convicted of murder and rape two
separate times due to an improper jury instruction during his first trial. See Tice, 647 F.3d
at 89, 93.
87. Wilson v. Flaherty, No. 3:10CV536, 2011 WL 2471207, at *1 (E.D. Va. June 20,
2011), affd, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013). The state
court jury delivered its verdict on June 21, 1999, finding Wilson not guilty on the charge of
first-degree murder and guilty on the charge of rape. See id. Wilson's appeal was denied by
the Court of Appeals of Virginia on March 8, 2000, and he did not appeal to the Supreme
Court of Virginia. Id.
88. See Tice, 647 F.3d at 89-94 (offering a detailed fact summary of Michelle Bosko's
rape and murder and the subsequent litigation); see also NORFOLK FOUR: A
MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE, http://www.norfolkfour.comlindex.php? (last visited Jan. 1,
2014) (providing thorough documentation of the media coverage concerning the "Norfolk
Four"). Although remarkable, a detailed discussion of the facts and procedural history of
the various trials concerning the "Norfolk Four" is beyond the scope of this Recent
Development.
89. See Tice, 647 F.3d at 90 (stating that Derek Tice testified that he and the other
suspects broke into the Bosko residence with a "claw hammer").
90. Id. at 91.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 91, 93. Interestingly, authorities probably would never have investigated
Omar Ballard had he not written a letter that implicated himself while he was serving time
in prison for separate violent crimes. See id. at 89. After pleading guilty to the rape and
murder of Michelle Bosko, Ballard was sentenced to life in prison. Id.
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murder and rape of Michelle Bosko and pleaded guilty to both crimes
on March 22, 2000.93
In both his 2000 confession and subsequent testimony under oath
in 2006, Ballard confirmed that he alone committed the crimes against
Michelle Bosko.94 So then, why were the Norfolk Four convicted for
Ballard's crimes? As it turns out, Williams, Dick, Tice, and Wilson
likely never would have set foot in a federal prison had investigators
acted diligently, accounting for all of the evidence.'
Originally, investigators theorized that only one individual raped
and murdered Michelle Bosko. 6 Indeed, the evidence at the crime
scene in no way supported the gang-rape theory. First, no furniture or
pictures had been disturbed, even in the bedroom, which would not
have been the case had a large group of men forcefully marauded
through the apartment.' The polish on the apartment's wood floors
also showed no signs of disturbance: they were free of scuff-marks,
inconsistent with a theory that a group of men had run through the
residence." Next, the pool of blood around the victim had not been
smeared in any way, as it likely would have been if multiple
individuals had attacked her.99 The victim's wounds, however,
provided the clearest evidence against the gang-rape theory: the three
stab wounds found on the victim's body were each located on her left
chest, "5 inches deep, equidistant apart, and in the same direction.""o
The chances of finding such a consistent stabbing pattern from an
attack by multiple assailants are slim to none-especially with a
struggling victim."o'
Yet despite these findings, investigators-led by homicide
detective Robert Glenn Ford-insisted that a group of men
committed the crimes against Michelle Bosko.1" In an attempt to
elicit high-profile confessions, Detective Ford and the other
investigators harshly dismissed the Norfolk Four's claims of
93. See id.
94. See id. at 93, 95.
95. See Executive Summary, supra note 85, at 2-3.
96. See id. at 2.
97. See id. at 2-3.
98. See id. at 2.
99. See id. at 3.
100. Id.
101. See id. ("That wound pattern was created by one person who rapidly stabbed the
victim several times consecutively. The stabbing pattern could not have been caused by
eight excited men gang-raping a young woman, passing a knife around, and taking turns
stabbing the victim as she struggled to survive.").
102. See id. at 4.
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innocence while conducting coercive interrogations. 3 The detectives
threatened those who did not confess with the death penalty and lied
to each defendant regarding incriminating evidence and witnesses
prepared to testify against him." Even more disconcerting, during
Omar Ballard's original confession, Detective Ford threatened to
take Ballard's plea agreement off of the table unless Ballard adopted
a story where he and the other defendants "took turns raping and
killing" Michelle Bosko.1os Detective Ford told Ballard that "the only
way [Ballard] could escape the death penalty was to" admit to Ford's
version of the events.06
The inconsistent statements and confessions elicited from each
defendant during questioning should have indicated that something
was amiss.107 Despite the obvious discrepancies, Detective Ford
accepted the pleas.' Though it proved no help to the Norfolk
Four,109 Detective Ford's questionable investigatory techniques would
eventually catch up to him: in 2010, a federal jury convicted him of
two counts of extortion and one count of lying to the FBI, calling into
question the tactics he used in many, if not all, of the nearly 200
homicide cases he solved as a detective.10
By the time of Omar Ballard's plea in 2000, Eric Wilson had
already served two years of his eight-and-one-half-year sentence."' In
2004, after learning of the new evidence surrounding the Bosko
murder and having his direct appeal denied,"2 Wilson asked the
Governor of Virginia to grant "an absolute pardon on the grounds of
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. Tice v. Johnson, 647 F.3d 87, 95-96 (4th Cir. 2011).
106. Id. at 96. Ballard described, under oath, Detective Ford's manipulation in 2006.
See id.
107. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (mentioning examples of the
inconsistent statements).
108. See Executive Summary, supra note 85, at 4.
109. See Sabrina Tavernise, Officer's Extortion Conviction Prompts Calls for Full
Exoneration of 'Norfolk Four,' N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2010, at All (stating that the charges
against Detective Ford "covered a period that began in 2003").
110. See Editorial, Cop's Conviction Taints Other Cases, PILOTONLINE.COM (Oct. 29,
2010), http://hamptonroads.com/2010/10/cops-conviction-taints-other-cases ("The feds ...
turned up witnesses, including 10 criminals who said they paid Ford, split ... reward
money and handed over a bag of cash in a Burger King parking lot. ... The detective
received as much as $70,000 . . . .").
111. See Tice, 647 F.3d at 89; see also Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 333 (4th Cir.
2012) ("Wilson was released from custody in 2005 after having fully served his
sentence....").
112. See Wilson v. Flaherty, No. 3:10CV536, 2011 WL 2471207, at *1 (E.D. Va. June
20, 2011), aff'd, 689 F.3d 332, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013).
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innocence.""' Nearly five years passed before then-Governor Tim
Kaine ruled on the petition, and while he finally acknowledged that
new evidence "raised substantial doubt about the validity of [the
Norfolk Four's] convictions," he also stated his belief that the
evidence did not "conclusively establish[] their innocence." 114 As a
result, Governor Kaine granted partial pardons to Dick, Tice, and
Williams-all of whom were still serving their sentences-releasing
them from prison while "keeping their convictions in place.""' Since
Wilson had already been released from prison in 2005, no relief was
granted to him.11 6
B. Wilson's Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
In March 2010, after the Governor refused to grant him any
relief, Wilson filed for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.117 To properly file a § 2254 petition in federal court, a
petitioner must fulfill the following requirements: (1) he must file the
petition while in custody under a state court conviction; (2) he must
be challenging the conviction for which he is currently in custody; (3)
he must be challenging such custody as violative "of the Constitution
or laws ... of the United States"; and (4) he must not have any
remedies available in state court."1 s The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia determined that Wilson failed to
fulfill the first of these requirements: he was not in custody for
purposes of § 2254, thus precluding the court's subject matter
jurisdiction.'19 Wilson subsequently appealed to the Fourth Circuit.'20
113. Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334. The other three members of the Norfolk Four also
petitioned the Governor of Virginia. Id. The petitions were filed "pursuant to Article V,
§ 12, of the Virginia Constitution and Virginia Code § 53.1-229." Id. Article V of the
Virginia Constitution establishes, in pertinent part, "[tlhe Governor shall have power ...
to grant reprieves and pardons after conviction except when the prosecution has been
carried on by the House of Delegates .... " VA. CONST. art. V, § 12. Section 53.1-229 of
the Virginia Code provides the Governor of Virginia "the power to commute capital
punishment and to grant pardons or reprieves." See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-229 (2008).
114. Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334.
115. Id.
116. See id. However, Wilson still faced collateral consequences of the crime. For a
discussion of how collateral consequences can last far longer than the direct consequences
of a crime, see supra Part I.B.
117. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334.
118. Requirements (1), (3), and (4) are explicitly stated in § 2254 itself. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(a)-(b) (2012). Requirement (2) is an interpretation of § 2254 set forth by the
Supreme Court in Maleng. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989) (per curiam)
(citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968)).
119. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334-35 ("[T]he Superintendent of the State Police
contended that the district court should deny the motion ... because Wilson was not in
[Vol. 92704
2014] INNOCENCE AND REDRESSABILITY EXCEPTION 705
Wilson's habeas petition "requested that his rape conviction be
declared null and void; that he be immediately released from his
violent sex offender status; and that Virginia expunge any and all
records relating to his conviction."121Although Wilson was no longer
incarcerated at the time of filing, he continued to be subject to the
registration requirements of the Virginia Sex Offender and Crimes
Against Minors Registry Act.12 Notably, the statute required Wilson
"to reregister for any significant changes in residence, employment,
online contact information, or vehicle ownership while a Virginia
resident."123 Because the jury convicted Wilson of a "sexually violent
offense" he "was required to reregister and confirm all of his
identifying information every 90 days." 124 Furthermore, Wilson's
conviction prevented him from adopting his stepson and from
working at certain construction sites. 125 These consequences have not
diminished in severity since Wilson moved his residence to Texas.126
Recognizing that he was not in custody under the normal
interpretation of the phrase, Wilson argued that the requirements of
the sex offender registration statute imposed such "substantial
restraints on his liberty" as to satisfy the custody requirement of
custody for purposes of federal habeas corpus and thus [the district court] lack[ed]
jurisdiction to consider his current habeas case." (second and third alterations in original)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. See id. at 335.
121. Id. at 334. Wilson claimed that he was "actually innocent" as a "victim of a corrupt
investigative process" and "that the Commonwealth of Virginia suppressed exculpatory
evidence." Id. Although Wilson did not know it at the time of filing, the lead detective in
the Bosko case-Detective Ford-would eventually be convicted on federal charges of
corruption in connection with work separate from the Bosko case itself. See Tim
McGlone, Ex-Norfolk Detective Gets 12 1/2 Years For Corruption, PILOTONLINE.COM
(Feb. 26, 2011), http://hamptonroads.com/2011/02/exnorfolk-detective-gets-12-12-years-
corruption. Wilson also moved to stay and abey his habeas petition in order to be able to
exhaust his remedies in state court. Wilson v. Flaherty, No. 3:10CV536, 2011 WL 2471207,
at *1 (E.D. Va. June 20, 2011), affd, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
2853 (2013).
122. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334. Wilson began registering as a sex offender before his
release from prison. Id.
123. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-903 (2008)).
124. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-904). Wilson
also had to register in a similar manner in Texas as a result of moving there. Id. at 334.
125. See id. at 335 ("[Wilson] claims that he is unable to work as an electrician at
particular jobs, such as at government buildings, or to enroll in electrician school to
advance his career because he cannot pass the required background checks. He claims that
he has been unable to adopt his eight-year-old stepson; that, to visit his stepson in school,
he must submit to a humiliating background check; that, for an unexplained reason, he
was not permitted to travel to Canada for his honeymoon; and that he must notify
authorities if he is going to be away from home for more than 24 hours.").
126. See id. at 334.
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§ 2254.127 Wilson acknowledged that collateral consequences, by
themselves, generally fail to impose restraints sufficient to meet the
custody requirement; he argued, however, that the sex offender
registration requirements caused him to experience "far more
substantial restraints than the normal consequences of a felony
conviction."12 8 In addition, Wilson emphasized the criminal
consequences of failing to obey the registration requirements.129
C. The Fourth Circuit's Decision
Despite recognizing that a petitioner need not be physically
detained in order to fulfill the custody requirement of § 2254, the
Fourth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Niemeyer, rejected Wilson's
argument.13 0 After acknowledging that Wilson "mounted a serious
constitutional challenge to his conviction"' 3' and that there existed a
strong possibility that Wilson was in fact innocent of raping Michelle
Bosko,132 the majority held that the sex offender registration
requirements were only collateral consequences of Wilson's rape
conviction.133 The majority viewed the accessibility of § 2254 habeas
relief through the lens of a direct versus collateral consequence
dichotomy, implying that a habeas petitioner may only fulfill the
custody requirement if he is suffering from direct consequences of the
challenged conviction.134 Thus, the court denied the habeas petition,
relying heavily on the Supreme Court's 1989 Maleng opinion."' In
addition, the majority cited numerous cases from its sister circuits in
127. Id. at 335.
128. Id.
129. See id. Under Virginia law, Wilson would be guilty of a "Class 6 felony" if he
"knowingly" failed to reregister or "knowingly provide[d] materially false information to
the Sex Offender and Crimes Against Minors Registry." VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-472.1(B)
(2009).
130. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 339 ("We simply and narrowly affirm the district court's
conclusion that Wilson is not 'in custody' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) and
that therefore the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain his habeas
petition.").
131. Id. at 333.
132. See id. at 339.
133. See id. at 337.
134. See id. at 338 (stating that Wilson's "restrictions are simply particularized
collateral consequences" and holding that to interpret such consequences as sufficient for
§ 2254's in custody requirement "would drastically expand the writ of habeas corpus
beyond its traditional purview").
135. See id. at 336-37. The court emphasized that the registration requirements were
not enforced as a direct punishment for Wilson's rape conviction-they were
"independent requirements imposed by the sex offender registration statutes in Virginia."
Id. at 337.
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an effort to bolster the conclusion that Wilson's collateral
consequences did not render him in custody for § 2254 purposes.13 6
In focusing on the Maleng opinion, the majority emphasized that
although the Supreme Court expanded the definition of "in custody"
in Jones,137 the Court never explicitly addressed whether it considered
a habeas petitioner to be in custody if the challenged conviction's
sentence had "fully expired" by the time of filing.138 The majority
stressed that if a petitioner could challenge a conviction after having
completely served the resulting sentence then the "in custody"
language of § 2254 would be superfluous and unnecessary.13 9
Furthermore, the majority categorically rejected Wilson's argument
that the registration requirements imposed a burden upon his liberty
that was greater than the adverse consequences generally experienced
by convicted felons.'"
Perhaps in an effort to ease the pain of the decision, the majority
explained that Wilson might still have the writ of coram nobis
available as a remedy in state court.14 ' The majority, however, hedged
this statement in a footnote,142 and rightly so: Wilson cannot take
advantage of the writ of coram nobis since it is generally unavailable
"for newly-discovered evidence or newly-arising facts."143 Thus,
136. See id. at 338; infra Part III.B (analyzing the propriety of the Wilson majority's
reliance on its sister circuits' opinions).
137. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 336 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963)
(establishing that an individual subject to the consequences of a possible parole violation
is considered to be "in custody" for habeas purposes)).
138. Id. (quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) (per curiam)).
139. See id. at 336 (allowing a habeas challenge in such circumstances "would read the
'in custody' requirement out of the statute"(quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492
(1989) (per curiam))).
140. See id. at 338 ("[T]hese restrictions are simply particularized collateral
consequences stemming from the way States and individuals have reacted to persons who
have been convicted of sex offenses, just as statutes impose other collateral consequences
generally on persons convicted of a felony." (citing Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492
(1989) (per curiam))).
141. See id. at 339. Ostensibly, the writ of coram nobis is "available for an error of fact
not apparent on the record, not attributable to the applicant's negligence, and which if
known by the court would have prevented rendition of the judgment." See id. at 339 n.3
(emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morris, 705 S.E.2d 503, 506 (2011))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
142. See id. at 339 & n.3 ("[T]he dissent may be correct that Virginia has limited the
application of the writ of coram nobis . . . .").
143. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 10-11, Wilson v. Flaherty, No. 12-986, 2013 WL
2428989 (U.S. June 4, 2013) (quoting Recent Cases, Federal Habeas Corpus - Custody
Requirement - Fourth Circuit Denies Forum to Sex Offender with Actual Innocence Claim.
- Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REV. 2105, 2107 n.30
(2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Neighbors v. Commonwealth, 650
S.E.2d 514, 517 (Va. 2007) (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-677 (2006) to restrict the
708 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92
Wilson's only remedy was to file for a writ of habeas corpus.'"
Regardless, the majority's ruling was clear: Wilson's sex offender
registration requirements did not satisfy the § 2254 custody
requirement.145 Therefore, according to the majority, the court lacked
the subject matter jurisdiction necessary to grant Wilson's petition for
federal habeas relief.'"
Not all three judges on the Fourth Circuit panel agreed. In
addition to Judge Davis's concurring opinion,147 Judge Wynn
published a robust dissent.'4 8 Judge Wynn took special issue with the
majority's failure to recognize a "pertinent line of precedents issued
after Maleng" that he contended "recognizes an exception for a
petitioner with compelling evidence of actual innocence and no
available forums for redress."149 Judge Wynn argued that if the
"grand purpose" of the writ of habeas corpus was to "protect[] ...
availability of the common law writ of coram nobis even further, only "[f]or any clerical
error or error in fact" (alteration in original)).
144. Under § 2254, a habeas petitioner must "exhaust[] the remedies available in the
courts of the State" before a federal court can have subject matter jurisdiction over the
petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (2012). This requirement is commonly referred to as
the "exhaustion doctrine." See O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). The
purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is "to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to
resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal
courts." Id. at 845. This does not mean, however, that a petitioner must exhaust every
possible method of review in the state court system. See id. at 844 (citing Wilwording v.
Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249-50 (1971) (per curiam)). Specifically, petitioners are not
required to seek remedies "where the state courts have not provided relief through those
remedies in the past." Id. (citing Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 249-50 (1971) (per
curiam)). It follows then that Wilson does not have to file for a writ of coram nobis simply
to satisfy the exhaustion requirements of § 2254. See supra notes 141-43 and
accompanying text (explaining that the writ of coram nobis would not provide Wilson any
relief). The Commonwealth of Virginia also weakly suggested that Wilson could pursue "a
writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence previously unknown or
unavailable to the petitioner." See Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 26, Wilson, No. 12-986, 2013 WL 2280951 (U.S. May 22, 2013). However, that Virginia
neglected to even mention this procedure at the district court and court of appeals levels
indicates the doubtfulness of its availability. See Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 143,
at 10. In addition, the writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence "offers no
opportunity to raise constitutional challenges," see id., and some of Wilson's new evidence
includes DNA test results, which are not "non-biological," see id.; Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334.
145. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 339.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 339-40 (Davis, J., concurring) (acknowledging that "when Congress
enacted ... the bill in which § 2254(a) is now codified, modern violent sex offender
statutes were not remotely within anyone's contemplation").
148. Id. at 340-49 (Wynn, J., dissenting); see also infra Part III.A-B (providing a more
in-depth discussion of Judge Wynn's rationale). Judge Davis's relatively short concurrence
stated that Wilson may have a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if he could not pursue the
coram nobis procedure. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 340 (Davis, J., concurring).
149. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
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individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful
restraints upon their liberty" then Wilson-an individual "with a
compelling claim of innocence"-should have an opportunity to
challenge his rape conviction under federal habeas laws.5 0 Judge
Wynn's dissent highlighted the fact that no binding precedent
foreclosed the relief Wilson sought and that, in fact, the Supreme
Court requires that the custody requirement be interpreted liberally,
especially in extreme cases, like Wilson's."'
III. THE WILSON MAJORITY DECISION: NARROW INTERPRETATION
& NON-BINDING PRECEDENT
By dismissing Eric Wilson's petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
the Fourth Circuit helped to inch federal habeas jurisprudence closer
to categorically precluding any collateral consequences from ever
meeting the habeas custody requirement. But no precedent
compelled the court to rule as it did in Wilson, a case of first
impression in the Fourth Circuit.152 In fact, as Judge Wynn observed,
federal case law actually left the Fourth Circuit an opening to
interpret § 2254's custody requirement as offering a remedy to
petitioners, like Eric Wilson, who would otherwise be perpetually
plagued by the collateral consequences of a wrongful conviction.'5 3
Unfortunately, the majority refused to adopt Judge Wynn's
"innocence and redressability" exception, relying instead on non-
binding precedent from other circuits and thereby forcing Eric Wilson
to continue to live with the collateral consequences of a crime that
DNA evidence strongly indicates he never committed. 154
A. A Narrow Interpretation
The Wilson majority accurately quoted Maleng when it stated
that the Supreme Court "never held ... that a habeas petitioner may
150. Id. (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)).
151. See id. at 348. There is no doubt that Wilson's situation is extreme, even for a
wrongful conviction case. See Alan Berlow, What Happened in Norfolk?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Aug. 19, 2007, at 36 ("[Elven in the upside-down world of wrongful convictions, the
extravagant case of Joseph Dick and his supposed partners in crime is in a class of its
own."). Berlow's article goes on to detail the Norfolk Four's situation, emphasizing that all
evidence points to their innocence. See generally id.
152. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 348 (Wynn, J., dissenting) ("[N]o precedent forecloses the
relief sought in this case."); infra Part III.A-B.
153. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting); infra Part III.A. Of course, no
state official or tribunal has officially declared Wilson's conviction "wrongful," but the
overwhelming evidence certainly seems to indicate that he never committed his alleged
crimes. See supra Part II.A.
154. See infra Part IIl.B.
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be 'in custody' under a conviction" when the petitioner filed for
habeas relief after the sentence of such conviction had expired."' The
opinion, however, proceeds to proclaim that "Maleng unambiguously
rules out" such an interpretation.'6 But does it? The Wilson majority
fails to acknowledge that although the Maleng Court interpreted
prior case law to "strongly impl[y]" such a result,' the Maleng
opinion did not completely preclude it.
The collateral consequences involved in Maleng and Wilson
differ radically. In Maleng, the petitioner argued that the potential
sentence-enhancing effects of a fully served state conviction rendered
him in custody under that conviction.' 8 Practically, the collateral
consequences of the Maleng conviction could adversely affect the
petitioner only if he was found guilty of another offense-which,
unfortunately for Mr. Maleng, happened.'59 In stark contrast, Eric
Wilson need not fulfill some future contingency for the collateral
consequences of his rape conviction to apply: the sex offender
registration requirements impose a substantial burden on him
regardless of any actions he takes in the future.160
Further, under the standard of Jones v. Cunningham, a case that
Maleng relies upon,'6' petitioners need not be in physical custody for
federal habeas purposes: other types of restraints-"restraints not
shared by the public generally"-may fulfill the habeas custody
requirement.162 Surely the general public does not suffer from the
restraints imposed on Wilson by the sex offender registration
requirements. Even if pre-Maleng case law "strongly implies" that
collateral consequences presumptively fall short of the Jones restraint
threshold, Supreme Court habeas jurisprudence does not
categorically preclude every type of collateral consequence from
satisfying § 2254's custody requirement.163
155. Wilson, 689 F.3d at 336 (quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) (per
curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 337.
157. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 491 (1989) (per curiam).
158. See id. at 490.
159. See id. at 489. Mr. Maleng challenged a 1958 robbery conviction in 1985,
approximately seven years after the robbery sentence expired. See id. When he filed his
habeas petition, Mr. Maleng was serving "two life terms and one 10-year term" for two
1976 charges of assault and one of "aiding a prisoner to escape," the sentences that the
1958 conviction enhanced. See id. at 489-90.
160. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 335 (noting briefly the requirements of the sex offender
registration system); supra Part II.B (summarizing the burdens placed on Wilson).
161. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491 (citing Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963)).
162. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963).
163. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491-92.
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Indeed, as Judge Wynn noted in dissent, cases after Maleng
"recognize[] an exception for a petitioner with compelling evidence of
actual innocence and no available forums for redress."'" In support
of his "innocence and redressability" exception, Judge Wynn quoted
Daniels v. United States,"s which posited that in "rare circumstances"
a petitioner could challenge a conviction despite already having
finished serving his sentence." The Daniels Court "recognize[d] that
there may be rare cases in which no channel of review [is] actually
available to a defendant with respect to a prior conviction, due to no
fault of his own."167 In fact, Daniels quoted the language of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 (another federal habeas statute) to explain that "rare
circumstances" could include a situation where a court "'discovered
[new] evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a
whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the
[petitioner] guilty of' " the challenged conviction.' 8 If anything, Eric
Wilson would seemingly make a fitting poster-child for this rare
category.169 Furthermore, although Daniels certainly reinforced the
notion that the collateral consequences of a sentence enhancement do
not rise to the level of restraint mandated by the custody
requirement, the Court explicitly restricted the holding to the facts
presented therein.'70
To support his argument that the majority misapplied the Maleng
ruling, Judge Wynn also referenced the Supreme Court's
Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Cossl7 ' opinion. Coss, like
Daniels, involved a petitioner challenging a prior conviction based
upon the fact that it enhanced a subsequent conviction.'72 As Judge
Wynn aptly pointed out,'73 Coss reinforced the notion that if a
164. Wilson, 689 F.3d at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
165. 532 U.S. 374 (2001).
166. Wilson, 689 F.3d at 341-42 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Daniels, 532 U.S. at
376).
167. Daniels, 532 U.S. at 383.
168. Id. at 383-84 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Supp. V 1994)).
169. See supra Part II.A (discussing the exculpatory evidence in the "Norfolk Four"
case); see also supra note 144 (arguing that Wilson fulfills § 2254's exhaustion
requirement).
170. See Daniels, 532 U.S. at 383-84 ("The circumstances of this case do not require us
to determine whether a defendant could use a motion under § 2255 to challenge a federal
sentence based on .. . a conviction [for which the defendant has no channel of review].").
171. 532 U.S. 394 (2001)
172. See id. at 394.
173. See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting)
(referencing the exception expressed in Coss).
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defendant "obtain[s] compelling evidence that he is actually innocent
of the crime for which he was convicted, and which he could not have
uncovered in a timely manner," then a habeas petition may be the
defendant's "only forum available for review."174 DNA evidence
implicating another man who would eventually plead guilty to
Wilson's alleged crime very likely falls into this narrow category.175
B. Non-Binding Precedent
In addition to the Wilson majority's narrow interpretation of
federal case law, Judge Wynn also took exception to the majority's
reliance on non-binding precedent from other circuits."' The majority
cited four cases from other circuits that each ruled sex offender
registration requirements alone do not render a petitioner in custody
for habeas purposes."' Although the majority's description of these
cases as a "unanimous body of law" is problematic in itself, a closer
look at the four cases reveals that-as Judge Wynn posits-even if
the cases were binding on the Fourth Circuit, Wilson is easily
distinguishable from them.7 8
174. Coss, 532 U.S. at 405-06 (citations omitted). Judge Wynn also described the
majority's suggestion that Wilson could start a coram nobis action in state court as an
untenable solution. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 345 n.4 (Wynn, J., dissenting) ("Virginia has
limited the reach of this writ to the correction of clerical errors." (citations omitted)); see
also supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (explaining Virginia's restriction on the
writ of coram nobis). The Wilson majority conceded that Judge Wynn "may be correct."
See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 339 n.3 (majority opinion).
175. See supra Part II.A.
176. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 348 (Wynn, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority opinion has
instead decided to follow the non-binding authority issued by a single panel of the Ninth
Circuit....").
177. See id. at 337-38 (majority opinion) (citing Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707 (7th
Cir. 2008); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2002); Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240
(9th Cir. 1999); Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1998)).
178. See id. at 347-48 (Wynn, J., dissenting). Judge Wynn actually notes that only three
of the cases-Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2008); Leslie v. Randle, 296 F.3d
518 (6th Cir. 2002); and Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1998)-are
"materially different" than Wilson. Id. Judge Wynn primarily only criticized the fourth
case-Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999)-as being a "summary decision."
See id. at 348. Upon closer examination though, the petitioner's basis for a habeas petition
in Henry is, in fact, much different than that in Wilson; the Henry petitioner premised his
habeas petition on the erroneous admission of an uncharged, separate crime into evidence
during his trial for child molestation. See Henry v. Estelle, 33 F.3d 1037, 1038 (9th Cir.
1993), vacated, 52 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 1995). In contrast, Wilson based his habeas petition
on the discovery of new, exculpatory evidence. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 334 (majority
opinion) ("Wilson filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus ... alleging that he is
actually innocent; that the Commonwealth of Virginia suppressed exculpatory evidence;
and that he was the victim of a corrupt investigative process.").
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The first problematic case the majority relied on was from the
Ninth Circuit, Williamson v. Gregoire,"9 which involved a habeas
petitioner subject to sex offender registration requirements after
completion of his sentence for child molestation-registration
requirements that he could satisfy by mail."'o In Williamson, the Ninth
Circuit distinguished the defendant's situation from other cases that
held petitioners to be in custody for habeas purposes.' One such
case held that the imposition of 500 hours of community service
fulfilled the custody requirement," while another case held a
petitioner to be in custody despite only requiring him to attend
fourteen hours of alcohol rehabilitation classes."3 In distinguishing
Williamson and ruling that the sex offender registration requirements
did not satisfy the habeas custody requirement, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that while the consequences considered in the prior cases
"somehow limit[ed] the putative habeas petitioner's movement," the
consequences in Williamson did not affect the petitioner so
adversely.'" Thus, the consequences in Williamson were merely
collateral." Moreover, while holding that sex offender registration
requirements did not meet the habeas custody threshold, the Ninth
Circuit noted that an obligation forcing a petitioner to be physically
present in a specific place could, in itself, fulfill the custody
requirement.8 6 Though the petitioner in Williamson only had to
register by mail,'" Wilson himself is required to register and
reregister in person with law enforcement.' So, while the
consequences of the Williamson petitioner's conviction did not
179. 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1998). Notably, Williamson explicitly held that collateral
consequences never sufficiently restrain liberty enough to render an individual in custody
for habeas purposes. See id. at 1183 ("But if application of the sex offender law is merely a
collateral consequence of Williamson's conviction, the federal courts are without habeas
jurisdiction in this case.").
180. See id. at 1181.
181. See id. at 1182-84.
182. See id. at 1183 (citing Barry v. Bergen Cnty. Prob. Dep't, 128 F.3d 152, 161 (3d
Cir. 1997)).
183. See id. at 1182 (citing Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922, 923
(9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).
184. Id. at 1183-84.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1182-83 (citing Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922,
923 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) ("[A]ppellant suffers a greater restraint upon his liberty-
mandatory class attendance-than the restraint suffered by a person who is released upon
his own recognizance.")).
187. See id. at 1184.
188. See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 335 (4th Cir. 2012) (stating that Wilson had
to "reregister every 90 days because his offense was a sexually violent offense" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3, at 9.
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obligate him to be physically present in a specific place, Wilson's
conviction plainly does so-a fact the Wilson majority declined to
mention in its opinion.'89 Therefore, even if Williamson were binding
precedent for the Fourth Circuit, its genuine-restraint-of-physical-
liberty-equals-custody standard would command a different outcome
for Wilson.
The second suspect precedent on which the majority relied came
from the Sixth Circuit in Leslie v. Randle."o The habeas petitioner in
Leslie pleaded guilty to state charges of rape and felonious assault in
1986.1" In 1997, while Leslie was still serving his sentence, the Ohio
legislature amended the state's sexual-predator statute, which, if
applied to Leslie, would force him to comply with new, more severe
reporting requirements.'2 Subsequently, Leslie mounted a habeas
challenge to the future imposition of the registration requirements.193
In holding that the future sex offender registration requirements did
not place Leslie in custody, the Sixth Circuit relied heavily on the
Ninth Circuit's rationale in Williamson.94 Therefore, outside of
providing another circuit to add to its sources, the Wilson majority's
reliance on Leslie does little more than duplicate the questionable
support provided by Williamson itself. Moreover, the Wilson majority
neglected to mention that the Leslie petitioner did not mount a
habeas challenge to his rape conviction; rather, the Leslie petitioner
challenged the constitutionality of the consequences themselves.' 95
Thus, unlike Wilson, who obtained exonerating evidence after being
convicted of rape,196 the petitioner in Leslie was inarguably guilty of
the underlying rape charge.'9
The third questionable case, Virsnieks v. Smith,'9 s another
proceeding with a petitioner registered as a sex-offender, also used a
189. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 332-39.
190. 296 F.3d 518 (6th Cir. 2002).
191. See id. at 519.
192. See id. at 519-21 (stating that the new registration requirements require the
petitioner to (1) register his home and work address with the sheriff; (2) register each of
his vehicles' license plate numbers with the sheriff; and (3) "verify his current home
address every 90 days"). The amended Ohio statute also contained a new "community
notification provision." Id. at 521.
193. See id. at 522.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. See Leslie, 296 F.3d at 519 (noting that the petitioner pleaded guilty to rape); id. at
522 ("Although Leslie is currently incarcerated, he is not seeking relief from the
conviction or sentence upon which his confinement is based.").
198. 521 F.3d 707 (7th Cir. 2008).
714 [Vol. 92
2014] INNOCENCE AND REDRESSABILITY EXCEPTION 715
rationale similar to the Ninth Circuit's Williamson decision in holding
that the petitioner failed to meet the custody requirement. The
Virsnieks court reasoned that "habeas petitioners must establish that
they are subject to conditions that 'significantly restrain . . . [their]
liberty.' "'" Ultimately, the court ruled that the petitioner's
registration requirements imposed only "minimal restrictions on [his]
physical liberty of movement.""2 0 He could update his information
with authorities through a "telephonic registration system" and, like
the petitioner in Williamson, he could reregister by mail.201 In
contrast, Wilson's in-person registration requirements actually
require him to be physically present at a specific place each year.202
Thus, the "minimal restrictions" 203 placed on the Virsnieks petitioner
are clearly distinguishable from the in-person registration
requirements imposed upon Wilson.
The fourth case the Wilson majority relied on, Henry v.
Lungren, proves to be the most problematic.205 Henry, another
Ninth Circuit case, explicitly relied on the Williamson rationale in
refusing to consider sex offender registration requirements as
sufficient to place a petitioner in custody for habeas purposes.206 The
major fault of the Wilson majority's reliance on Henry stems
primarily from Henry's lack of independent analysis and its summary
conclusion that "[r]egistration, even if it must be done in person at
the police station, does not constitute the type of severe, immediate
restraint on physical liberty necessary to render a petitioner 'in
custody' for the purposes of federal habeas corpus relief."207 Instead
199. Id. at 717-18 (alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,
243 (1963)).
200. Id. at 720.
201. See id. at 719-20.
202. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012)
(No. 11-6919), 2011 WL 5006455, at *3 ("Eric Wilson is required to 'report to the local law
enforcement authority designated as [his] primary registration authority ... once each
year not earlier than the 30th day before and not later than the 30th day after the
anniversary of [his] date of birth.' " (alterations in original) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 62.058(a) (West 2006))).
203. Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 720.
204. 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999).
205. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 348 (Wynn, J., dissenting) ("[T]he majority opinion has ...
decided to follow the non-binding authority issued by a single panel of the Ninth
Circuit .... I question the majority opinion's decision to follow the Ninth Circuit's decade-
old summary decision in Henry." (citations omitted)).
206. Henry, 164 F.3d at 1242. In fact, the oral arguments for Henry and Williamson
were heard on the same day, albeit in front of different panels. Id.
207. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 348 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Henry, 164 F.3d at
1242).
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of discussing the relationship between registration requirements and
the habeas custody requirement, approximately half of the three-page
Henry opinion analyzes the "relation back" provision contained in
Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 208 The Henry
court's lack of independent analysis provides minimal, if any, support
for the Wilson majority's holding.
Upon closer analysis, the four non-binding sister circuit cases on
which the Wilson majority relied fail to convincingly support the
ultimate conclusion that Wilson was not in custody under § 2254. As
Judge Wynn indicated, three of the cases-Williamson, Leslie, and
Virsnieks-contained facts that are "materially distinguishable from"
Wilson.209 Furthermore, the fourth case, Henry, neglects to even
include any independent analysis of the pertinent issue.210 Thus, as
Judge Wynn posited, it would be a stretch to consider the four cases a
"unanimous" body of law.2 11
Instead of depending on non-binding authorities2 12 and adopting
a narrow interpretation of Supreme Court precedent 213 to further
promote the direct versus collateral consequence dichotomy, the
Fourth Circuit should have used Wilson to establish a new exception
to the custody requirement. Judge Wynn's proposed "innocence and
redressability" exception represents an attractive option. As discussed
below, this exception would provide for a more accurate reading of
binding precedent and a more practical approach to the custody
requirement.
IV. THE "INNOCENCE AND REDRESSABILITY" EXCEPTION: A FAIR
APPROACH
As Judge Wynn noted, the consequences of Wilson's rape
conviction substantially restrict his "liberty to do those things which
in this country free [people] are entitled to do."214 In addition to the
in-person reporting requirements, various municipal sex offender
ordinances physically restrict Wilson's ability to travel to certain
208. See Henry, 164 F.3d at 1241; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c) (describing the
situations in which an amendment to a pleading relates back to the original pleading).
209. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 347-48 (Wynn, J., dissenting); supra notes 179-203 and
accompanying text.
210. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 348; supra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
211. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 348.
212. See supra notes 176-208 and accompanying text.
213. See supra Part III.A.
214. Wilson, 689 F.3d at 348 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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areas.2 15 As previously mentioned, Wilson can only visit his stepson at
school after passing a "humiliating" background check, and he cannot
work as an electrician at certain sites like government buildings, thus
restricting his ability to engage in his occupation of choice. 1
Moreover, as a result of the various sex offender ordinances
throughout the United States, should Wilson ever want to travel, he
must first learn the zone restrictions imposed on sex offenders by the
municipality of his destination, and then abide by them or face
incarceration.21 7 In other words, Wilson's "collateral consequences"
prevent him from visiting various areas in certain cities and, in some
cases, from entire cities altogether.218 Certainly, these physical,
movement-limiting restraints are "not shared by the public
generally"; 2 19 these restraints are not even experienced by felons
generally.220 If the "grand purpose" of the writ of habeas corpus is to
"protect[] . .. individuals against erosion of their right to be free from
wrongful restraints upon their liberty," 2 21 should the Fourth Circuit
have refused to grant the writ to a petitioner who has undeniably
strong evidence indicating that he was wrongfully convicted of rape?
From the beginning, the Wilson majority's focus on the direct
versus collateral consequence dichotomy created a virtually
insurmountable obstacle for the petitioner to overcome.222 When a
court categorically rejects the proposition that collateral
consequences could ever place a petitioner in custody, it risks creating
215. See id. at 335 (majority opinion) (noting that Wilson was not allowed to visit
Canada for his honeymoon and cannot "visit his stepson in school" without first passing a
background test).
216. Id.
217. See id. at 348 n.8 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (citing various municipal ordinances that,
when viewed in the aggregate, essentially exclude convicted sex offenders from the entire
town).
218. See id.; see also Cassie Dallas, Comment, Not in My Backyard: The Implications of
Sex Offender Residency Ordinances in Texas and Beyond, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1235,
1246 & n.88 (2009) (citing Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 851 (S.D. Iowa 2004), rev'd,
405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005)) ("[R]egistrants are effectively zoned out of Des Moines,
Iowa, because overlapping distance markers cover almost the entire city.").
219. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963).
220. Although the Wilson majority accurately states that all convicted felons suffer
from collateral consequences, doing so generalizes the various types of collateral
consequences as falling conveniently into one broad category, thus placing minor
consequences on the same level as severe consequences. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 338-39.
221. Id. at 341 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Jones, 371 U.S. at 243).
222. As demonstrated in the Wilson majority opinion, simply categorizing sex offender
registration requirements as collateral consequences essentially bars petitioners (at least
those who have completed their sentences) from successfully arguing that they are in
custody under § 2254, regardless of the severity of the registration requirements. See id. at
337 (majority opinion).
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a perverse incentive for petitioners in Wilson's situation: potentially,
these individuals may be forced to purposely violate their registration
requirements simply to fulfill the custody requirement imposed by the
habeas statutes.22 Given that collateral consequences are increasing
in frequency and severity, thus blurring the formerly clear distinction
224 tssolbetween them and direct consequences, courts should dispense with
the direct versus collateral consequence test as a means for
determining whether an individual is in custody.225 Instead, courts
should apply a test that more aptly promotes the purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus: to "examine and determine the right of any
individual [unlawfully] restrained of his personal liberty to be
discharged from such restraint." 2 26 Judge Wynn's "innocence and
redressability" exception provides an attractive option for achieving
this purpose.
First, to ensure that the courts do not "read the 'in custody'
requirement out of the [habeas] statute," courts should still initially
ask whether the consequences of the challenged conviction restrain a
petitioner's liberty enough to invoke the Great Writ.227 Though courts
today already engage in this fact-based inquiry, this Recent
Development suggests that courts refrain from labeling restraints as
direct or collateral consequences, as this glosses over the actual
encroachment of the petitioner's rights.228 After determining that the
petitioner's rights are adequately restrained-perhaps by
223. See id. at 341 n.2 (Wynn, J., dissenting).
224. See Roberts, supra note 25, at 680 ("It is thus far from clear exactly where the line
between direct and collateral consequences falls. At a minimum, the actual term of jail or
prison time imposed by the court, as well as any fines or term of probation, fall on the
'direct' side of the line. Beyond that, the convoluted jurisprudence of what constitutes a
collateral consequence in each particular jurisdiction governs." (citation omitted)).
225. To avoid this complicated situation, attorneys could, of course, file a federal
habeas petition while their client is still incarcerated and then move to stay and abey the
petition to allow the exhaustion of state remedies (which is required by § 2254(b)(1)). This
approach, however, ignores the practicalities of the already over-burdened legal system.
First, this approach raises the possibility of increasing the already high cost of hiring an
attorney. And second, this approach could possibly result in attorneys pre-emptively filing
habeas petitions for every incarcerated client, perhaps only to avoid malpractice liability
should exonerating evidence later appear. Filing habeas petitions in such a manner could
overwhelm an already burdened court system and could ultimately diminish the integrity
of the writ of habeas corpus itself.
226. United States ex reL Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 295 (1904) (Brewer, J.,
concurring).
227. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989) (per curiam).
228. See supra Part I.B. This Recent Development argues that sex offender registration
requirements, at least those that require in-person registration, impose sufficient restraints
on a petitioner's rights so as to make available the writ of habeas corpus (assuming the
petitioner "passes" the two elements of the "innocence and redressability" test).
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appropriately using the "genuine restraint on [physical] liberty"
rationale in Williamson229 _-Courts should then focus on the
"redressability" aspect of Judge Wynn's "innocence and
redressability" exception. Thus, courts should ask whether "a habeas
petition" is the "only forum available for review of the . ..
conviction." 23 0  This inquiry would preserve the exhaustion
requirement of § 2254 by forcing petitioners to seek all available state
remedies before resorting to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus.231
The next step of the "innocence and redressability" inquiry
would ask whether the habeas petitioner has "obtain[ed] compelling
evidence" of innocence for "the crime for which he was convicted." 232
Judge Wynn aptly concluded that post-Maleng Supreme Court
decisions explicitly provided for such an exception to the apparently
strict habeas in custody requirement.233 Presumably, the purpose of
the writ of habeas corpus is to free individuals whose liberty is
unlawfully restrained.234 Asking the basic question of whether a
petitioner is innocent of the crime that restrains his or her liberty
would promote the rationale of the Great Writ far more effectively
than disposing of a habeas application simply because the petitioner's
conviction only imposes "collateral" consequences.
CONCLUSION
The Wilson majority's focus on the direct versus collateral
consequence dichotomy in habeas jurisprudence fails to adequately
promote the central purpose of the Great Writ. Especially in the case
of sex offenders, the "collateral" consequences of a conviction can
229. See Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The precedents
that have found a restraint on liberty rely heavily on the notion of a physical sense of
liberty-that is, whether the legal disability in question somehow limits the putative
habeas petitioner's movement.").
230. See Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2012) (Wynn, J., dissenting)
(quoting Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 406 (2001)).
231. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c) (2012) (exhaustion requirement); see also supra note
144 (discussing the "exhaustion doctrine").
232. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 344 (Wynn, J., dissenting) (quoting Lackawanna Cnty.
Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 405 (2001)). This question would only apply after the
window for any direct or collateral challenge to the conviction had already passed. See
Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 405 (2001). This condition,
however, is appropriately addressed by the "redressability" requirement of the test. See
supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
233. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 343-44 (citing Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 384
(2001); Coss, 532 U.S. at 405); supra Part III.A.
234. See SOKOL, supra note 8, at 30.
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adversely affect an individual far longer than the "direct"
consequences of the sentence itself.235 Thus, under contemporary
jurisprudence, individuals such as Eric Wilson-who is "almost
certainly innocent of the sex offense[]" conviction 236-face the
possibility of being labeled a sex offender without having any means
by which to challenge the conviction.23 7
Instead of focusing its § 2254 custody requirement analysis on the
direct versus collateral consequence dichotomy, the Wilson majority
should have adopted Judge Wynn's "innocence and redressability"
exception. This exception does not diminish courts' necessary fact-
based exploration of whether the consequences of a conviction
sufficiently restrain a petitioner's personal liberty. Rather, by
promoting the "innocence and redressability" exception, this Recent
Development seeks to underscore the fact that the Wilson
majority's-and many other courts'-narrow focus on the category of
consequence a petitioner experiences fails to adequately promote the
central purpose of the writ of habeas corpus-to "protect[] ...
individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful
restraints upon their liberty."238 At the very least, the "innocence and
redressability" exception would allow Eric Wilson an opportunity to
challenge his rape conviction; the simple notion of justice compels as
much.239
J. CLAY DOUGLAS**
235. See Wilson, 689 F.3d at 341 ("For the duration of his life ... Wilson will be
required to regularly report .. . to the police and [be] prevented from being present in any
location generally frequented by children-even though he is almost certainly innocent of
the sex offenses that would normally require such measures.").
236. Id.
237. As already acknowledged supra note 174, although the Wilson majority claims
that Wilson could invoke a state claim of coram nobis, Judge Wynn pointed out that
"Virginia has limited the reach of this writ to the correction of clerical errors." See Wilson,
689 F.3d at 345 n.4.
238. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). Moreover, adoption of Judge
Wynn's test could help avoid one commentator's suggestion that Congress amend the
habeas statutes. See Moyer, supra note 13, at 802.
239. The Supreme Court denied Wilson's petition for writ of certiorari on June 24,
2013. Wilson v. Flaherty, 133 S. Ct. 2853 (2013).
** The author would like to thank his editor, Thomas Will, for helping to refine this
Recent Development.
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